Actual accounts from Military Dispatches, from and about the
5th Tennessee Regiment.
FEBRUARY 28 to APRIL 8, 1862 -- Battle of Madrid Bend and Island No. 10.
C. S, STEAMER MOHAWK, The following are the views of Captain Gray of his examination of Island No. 10 Bend, made August 14, 1861:
That it is a strong position naturally for erecting works to defend the passage of the Mississippi River; that a series of earthworks would be necessary, and all the material required would be convenient and made available without delay; that there should be a bastion earthwork upon the mainland, and upon Island No. 10 a redoubt inclosed to hold 1,000 men; that at a point say three-quarters of a mile above the mainland work, and on the same side of the river, a redan earthwork should be thrown up immediately, and a couple of 12-pounders or two 32-pounders, if at hand, placed in position; also a battery of horse artillery, with a regiment or troop (part horse and part infantry) encamped at the redan fort; the artillery to be placed in position to operate with the heavier pieces in defending the landing or to be moved along the bank of the river, as might be required. The redan can be thrown up of earth and the guns mounted en barbette in a very little while. This battery would effectually prevent the landing of troops and artillery of the enemy, should they attempt to take possession of the neck of land for the purpose of cutting off communication with New Madrid by water, and also the communication by road to Union City.
An accurate survey should be at once made of Island No. 10 and the mainland on the left bank on Tennessee side, for the purpose of erecting the earthworks referred to.
With these three batteries a most powerful, concentrated, raking as well as plunging fire could be kept up upon boats of any character coming down the river, and at a distance from each battery ranging from 500 yards to several miles, if desired. Every portion of a boat attempting to pass would be exposed, even to the rudder, the covering of the deck, broadsides, and stern at the same instant.
The position of these batteries, to be taken by a flank movement, is as strong in favor of the forts as they would be against an enemy on the water, if properly constructed. That with a cordon of stations on the route from the river to Union City from 25 to 35 miles in length, the whole of Northwestern Tennessee could be easily defended; and no more favorable line could be found to resist the enemy, while being ready at any moment to concentrate rapidly a strong force (without weakening the main defenses) for the purpose of offensive movements northward upon our foes.
If New Madrid was threatened by a land attack, the garrison of New Madrid could be re-enforced from the neck in a few hours. With the forts above placed, one large steamer at least might always be kept in readiness at New Madrid to transport troops either side, as the emergency required.
The situation of Island No. 10, in connection with the mainland defenses, for the purpose of repelling the enemy from the New Madrid side as well as the Tennessee side, and for a protection to the valley of the Mississippi and a magnificent section of the State of Tennessee, has no superior, in my judgment, above Memphis.  Report of Lieutenant, W. O. Williams, C. S. Army, A. D. C.
HUMBOLDT, Midnight, September 3, 1861.
Captain BLAKE:
We have been here three hours. The enemy are maneuvering with gunboats and 3,000 men near Columbus, on Missouri side. We have ordered Colonel McCown, who is at Union City, to put his whole force aboard the cars and hold himself in readiness to move at a minute's notice. We start in a few moments for Union City. We are in telegraph office, communicating with Hickman, Columbus, and Union City. Pillow's command is fast arriving at Hickman. We have 2,500 men there now. Send every available company, with provisions, to Union City, to take the place of the force that is leaving. Send a good officer to command them. Also tell Captain Hunt to send up the rifled 32-pounder, with ammunition for it, to Union City. The enemy are reconnoitering with rockets. We will have a fight to-morrow unless they retreat. Thrasher's company has left here. Had you not better court-martial him, unless you ordered him to leave? The commissary and quartermaster must be ready to send supplies to Union City, or to other points via Union City, without one moment's delay.
W. O. WILLIAMS,
Lieutenant, C. S. Army, A. D. C. Report of Lieutenant, W. O. Williams, C. S. Army, A. D. C.
REDAN FORT, CAMP POLK, ISLAND No. 10
Capt. E. D. BLAKE,Thursday, September 18, 1861. A. A. A. G., Dep't No. 2, C. S. Army, Mississippi Valley: CAPTAIN: It becomes my duty to report to you that the progress of our work has been so retarded by circumstances over which I have no control, that in my judgment any further drawback may cause us to lose, should certain contingencies happen, one of the finest strategic positions for the defense of the Mississippi Valley. The multiplicity of matters surrounding you at Columbus has caused this point, I am afraid, to become of much less consideration than it really deserves. I am now fully convinced that Island No. 10, with its connections properly fortified, would offer the greatest resistance to a combined water and land attack of the enemy, while at the same moment he would receive an irreparable injury. A concentrated cross-fire from the three batteries I proposed would be irresistible by the boats of the enemy, and our intrenchments from the river to the lake could not be taken by a force five times superior in numbers. We cannot be outflanked, owing to the proximity of the bayou and lake to the river, and it would be equally impossible to invest us. The general character of the ground is the most inviting to an attack and certain defeat of the enemy. To an ordinary observer the absence of any impressively strong features in the topography might; create an unfavorable opinion as to its strength, but I am satisfied that a close study of the ground by a military man would develop elements of power that to another might seem objects of weakness. The work I am now constructing is the advanced position on the left bank of the river, 1½ miles above the head of Island No. 10. It was necessary to occupy this site during the season of low water and until the highest spring rise, to prevent the enemy landing and flanking the island battery as well as the mainland battery. It is also our strongest point of defense should the descent of the river be attempted by the enemy in the next eight or nine months and a heavy force be landed for a flank movement. The distance from this point (the redan) to the bayou, which has 5 feet permanent water in it and increasing in depth, to the lake, 2 miles farther: is only 1,100 yards. The bayou, with comparatively little labor, can be rendered impassable to an enemy. Upon the highest rise of the river next spring or summer nature will then accomplish for us what we are artificially endeavoring to do, that of forming a barrier over which the enemy cannot pass; for the Mississippi and the lake will then be united, and if a landing is attempted, it must be within short range of our other two batteries. "Reelsfoot Lake," as it is called, is some 40 miles long, lying nearly north and south, and making a junction with the Mississippi at high water above us, and below us also by way of the Obion Branch, renders our position just here, with comparatively little trouble, evidently a very formidable one. The lake is in many places very deep, and the dead cypress timber scattered about it makes it difficult to navigate. Even if boats could be had and a crossing effected by an enemy, a small body of our troops could prevent a landing. It is 11 miles wide in places, and filled with very fine fish and wild game. We have now only four 32-pounders at this post; we had six pieces in position, but you arc aware that the two 24-pounder siege guns were taken to Columbus. Ten heavy pieces could be placed in position at once in the redan if we had them. The redan covers the channel of the river 500 to 1,000 yards off. It is our left flank of the line of intrenchments connecting the river Mississippi and Reelsfoot Lake, and two or three of the barbette guns can be made to rake the entire front of our line to the bayou. Our parapet in the redan is much weakened by embrasures, made necessary by the 32-pounders being mounted upon naval carriages or trucks. I would recommend mounting these guns upon siege carriages similar to the 24-pounders. The weight of the guns is about the same. Our intrenchments are not completed at this point, and unless we have the assistance I have asked for, and which I supposed could be easily supplied from Memphis and Fort Pillow, I fear this all-important work will not be accomplished in time to be of use. In a very short time now it will be necessary to gather in the crops, and our farmers in the Bend must need their hands. We have not had over 80 negroes at work, and no similar force and facilities at my command could have done more than they have done; so you will readily perceive the impossibility of finishing the fortifications at an early date unless I could have for 10 or 15 days some 500 hands from Fort Pillow, where I learn some 2,000 are at work. I have no boat either, which is essential to a rapid construction of the batteries at Island No. 10. the Mohawk, placed under my orders for topographical service, has been taken off some time ago for other duty by orders from your department. Since I have seen Columbus, I have not lessened my opinion, previously given to the commanding general, of its strong natural facilities for defense; but further examinations have strengthened my belief of the great importance of Island No. 10 in connection with a line of defense including New Madrid and Union City, as a powerful base of operations against the enemy. I have been but to serious inconvenience by an order causing suddenly my assistant, Mr. Rowley, and my clerk, Mr. Miller, who had charge of my commissary stores and papers, to be taken away from this post. The general commanding must have been misled by a misapprehension of facts in some way. Mr. Miller was a civilian, appointed by me as clerk and to attend to my commissary matters, and he was in no way an army officer. I had attentively taught Mr. Rowley and Mr. Miller to assist me in systematically conducting the important duties confided to me, and their sudden withdrawal, without an hour's notice, has not only inconvenienced me, but been really detrimental to the service. Lieutenant Snowdon is sick, and cannot be exposed to the labors of an assistant probably for some time. He is to-day wholly disabled by fever. I feel sure that had the general known of the circumstances I have related, he would not have ordered them away at so necessary a period in the progress of this work, unless on some imperative occasion. I will send you, captain, in a day or two, a sketch of this section of country, exhibiting the situation of our works, if I can possibly secure time from my other labors. In the mean time, if you can lay before the commanding general the necessity, in my opinion, of more speedy movement in the works here, I shall be better satisfied that we shall be altogether upon a much safer basis to meet the enemy under any circumstances that may arise. If he will give me an order for 500 negroes from Fort Pillow and send me a small steamer and authority to get the guns from Memphis, I will soon be enabled to say we are prepared. I remain, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. B. GRAY,
Captain, C. S. Army, and Topographical Engineer, Superintending Fortifications, Island No. 10. Report of Brigadier-General, M. JEFF. THOMPSON
CAMP BROWN, Mo., October 7, 1861 -- 9 a.m.
Col. JAMES A. WALKER, Commanding at New Madrid, Mo.:
SIR: Nearly all the men you sent along have deserted, and those that are here are very much dissatisfied. It seems, from their reports, that you are furloughing all the men left with you to garrison the post of New Madrid, and it is said you have even furnished them with State transportation to go home in. This is very demoralizing, and must be peremptorily stopped; and if you have let any go home, it is in express opposition to my orders left with you. I will state here again, plainly, that no man, soldier or officer, shall be furloughed again for more than twenty-four hours, for the reason that it demoralizes the command, by producing dissatisfaction both in camp and at home. You must enforce the strictest military discipline around your post, as by this means only can you give satisfaction to any one. Catch all the deserters you can. Yours, &c.,
M. JEFF. THOMPSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding. Report of Maj. Gen. John P. McCown, C. S. Army, commanding at Madrid Bend.
MADRID BEND, March 1, 1862--9 p.m.
DEAR COLONEL: The enemy's cavalry chased General Jeff. Thompson from Sikeston to-day--he says one regiment. Their main force yesterday was reported at Benton, said to be 25,000 or 30,000, including one mortar and siege pieces. When I arrived here, four days since, I found little done. I now have fifteen guns mounted. I did not get any artillery soldiers until this evening. I have strengthened the work at New Madrid as much as possible, even to putting an abatis round it. It stands near the shore, and can at this stage of water be flanked by the gunboats here. It is garrisoned by two regiments of Arkansas troops, under command of Colonel Gantt. I am constructing a work on the bank of the river near the bayou. This can also be flanked by the gunboats. This is garrisoned by three regiments, two regiments under Colonel Walker, and I send down to-night Colonel Travis' Tennessee regiment. I will try and maintain this work. I have sent no more troops to New Madrid, for the reason that more troops would mask the fire of the gunboats. The country being perfectly level, I can re-enforce from this place in one hour. What I fear most is that the enemy's gunboats may pass this place unless they give me a few days to prepare for them. The guns and ammunition arrived here in the greatest confusion. I shall mount guns and throw up breastworks afterwards. If the gunboats pass and defeat Hollins, New Madrid must fall. If New Madrid fall, I can be perfectly besieged by their occupation of Tipton. I have here under my command ten regiments and three small battalions, in all about 5,000 infantry. I have not half force enough to fight in any other way than behind my trenches on the river shore with any certainty of success. I have two batteries, one opposite No. 10 and the other at Madrid. If forces could be massed at Madrid, that force could be destroyed, but should their gunboats pass, the force would be cut off from Tennessee. I will fight the gunboats as long as they desire, but I fear they will try the Port Royal game on me. Unless I have time, I fear they may succeed. However, I hope after they pass that I may turn them over to Commodore Hollins in a shattered condition. Commodore Hollins has five gunboats, four at New Madrid and one here. I wish the general was here. Yours, sincerely,
J.P. McCOWN,
Brigadier-General. Col. THOMAS JORDAN, Jackson, Tenn. N. B.--Colonel Carroll, Fifteenth Tennessee Regiment, has a company in his regiment from this place. I need them much. Please send it to me.
J.P. McC.
N. B.--Everything, guns, ammunition, and men, have been sent here in utter confusion. I informed General Polk that every day was of importance, even if we lost some guns in holding it (Columbus). J.P. McC. Report of Brigadier-General, J.P. McCown
HEADQUARTERS,
General LEONIDAS POLK, Commanding:
Madrid Bend, March 7, 1862. GENERAL: Yesterday the enemy appeared at Point Pleasant. At my request Commodore Hollins sent two gunboats to remove all means of crossing from the Missouri shore. Several shots (6-pounders) were fired at the Kentucky. The gunboats soon removed the annoyance. Should I fail to hold New Madrid, it would require 10,000 men to maintain my position in the bend, unprotected by works as it is. I consider New Madrid of great importance. I shall not relinquish it without a struggle. We have fifty guns of all sorts mounted at [Island] 10 and on shore opposite, including siege guns and floating battery. The carriages for many of our best guns can't be found. Where are they? The guns mounted are not all protected by works. A captain in Colonel Travis' regiment was seriously wounded yesterday. I have not been able yet to send any force to Tiptonville except a small force of cavalry. Can't the force in my front at New Madrid be cut to pieces or captured? All I can do is to hold what I have and risk nothing. Yours, &c.,
J.P. McCOWN,
Brigadier-General. Report of Brigadier-General, J.P. McCown
HEADQUARTERS,
Madrid Bend, March 31, 1862. COLONEL: At midnight on the night of February 25 I was directed by Major-General Polk to proceed to this point. I arrived here early on the morning of February 26 and proceeded to examine the position, including New Madrid and Island No. 10. I found no guns or works on the island. On the main-land, opposite the island, Batteries Nos. 1 and 5 were constructed and partially armed. No magazine constructed for No. 5, and the one for No. 1 was over-flowed. New Madrid was defended by Fort Thompson, a small work, and well armed with cannon. This work was garrisoned by the Eleventh and Twelfth Arkansas Regiments and Captains Stewart's and Upton's companies of artillery, under the command of Col. E. W. Gantt, of the Twelfth Arkansas. Learning that the enemy was advancing on the place in force, I ordered Col. L. M. Walker, with two regiments, from Fort Pillow. On the arrival of these two regiments I occupied the position on the shore of the mouth of the Bayou Saint John. On the night of the 26th I returned to Columbus and reported the condition of affairs to Major-General Polk. I returned to Madrid Bend on the 27th. The enemy appeared before New Madrid on the 1st instant, having the day previous driven in our scouts, capturing from General M. Jeff. Thompson several of his small cannon. The work being constructed at the mouth of the bayou was garrisoned by Colonel Travis' Fifth Tennessee Regiment, Colonel Walker's Fortieth Regiment, and Colonel Baker's First Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi Regiment, and Capt. Smith P. Bankhead's field battery, under command of Colonel Travis. Brig. Gen. A. P. Stewart was assigned to the command of the forces at New Madrid. March 4, the enemy advanced with artillery and infantry., and were promptly repulsed by the fire from Commander Hollins' fleet of gun-boats and our artillery. March 5, picket skirmishing all day. March 6, the enemy planted a battery at Point Pleasant, and by a white flag induced Captain Dunnington (Pontchartrain) to near the shore, when she was fired into by musketry, killing and wounding several. Picket skirmishing all day. March 7, a strong advance of the enemy was driven back by the fire from our gunboats, Captain Bankhead's battery, and Capt. R. A. Stewart's Parrott guns. The gunboats failed to silence the battery at Point Pleasant, which attempt was renewed on the 8th and 9th with a like result, Capt. R. A. Stewart driving the enemy's infantry from the shore at that point with his Parrott guns. March 10, heavy picket skirmishing all day. March 11, I placed two 24-pounder siege pieces opposite Point Pleasant. March 13, the enemy planted some batteries during the night, with rifle pits supporting the batteries. They opened fire upon our transports, hitting all that approached Fort Thompson. The enemy's guns were 24-pounders and one 8-inch gun. Commander Hollins, from his gunboats, and we with our guns from the works, returned the fire, repulsing one heavy advance upon the fort at the mouth of the bayou. By a careful examination of their works I became satisfied that they were making regular approaches to cut off communication with the lower fort (Fort Thompson). I was also convinced that our gunboats could not stand against their land batteries, and that unless the fleet dropped below Point Pleasant it would be cut off. Commander Hollins and General Stewart concurring in this opinion, I ordered the evacuation of New Madrid. I directed General Stewart to take the immediate direction of the evacuation of Fort Thompson, placing at his disposal the steamer Louisville, a large wharf-boat lying at the fort, and two gunboats; and to General L. M. Walker that of the work at the mouth of the bayou, placing at his disposal the steamer De Soto and one gunboat, and I ordered the steamers Winchester and Ohio Belle to report to General Walker. The captain of the Winchester did not obey the order. At 11 o'clock a heavy rain-storm, that lasted all night, impeded the work. All the field guns were brought off; the heavy guns were spiked and some of the carriages injured; the ammunition all saved, except a few shot and the ammunition in caissons and limbers of Captain Bankhead's battery. These caissons and limbers, with their contents, were thrown into the river. No commissary stores were left that I am aware of. Several wagons were left at Fort Thompson. The remaining wagons and artillery horses were removed to Madrid Bend. I send inclosed Colonel Gantt's report of the evacuation of Fort Thompson, and as soon as I can procure reports from Generals Stewart and Walker I shall forward them. The gunboat fleet and transports dropped down to Tiptonville, retaining only such as were necessary for water boats, transports, and hospitals. The bad weather and exposure had increased our sick to an alarming extent. So harassing was the duty at New Madrid, that I on several occasions ordered Colonel Neely, Fourth Tennessee, and Colonel Scott's Twelfth Louisiana Regiments to that point for twenty-four hours to do guard and picket duty. Several men and one officer were left at Fort Thompson, having hid themselves to avoid work or to shelter themselves from rain. Dr. W. S. Bell, medical director, Lieutenant Robinson, Captain West, provost-marshal, and one man lost their lives in defense of New Madrid. Captain Hallum, of the Fifth Tennessee Regiment, was dangerously wounded. The principal object I had in holding New Madrid was to possess a landing for re-enforcements to fight the enemy, should I receive them. March 14, disposed my force so as to prevent a crossing of the enemy. March 15, the Federal fleet, gunboats, mortar floats, and transports appeared and opened fire upon us. Our batteries did not reply. March 16, the Federal fleet advanced in line of battle and remained at long range. March 17, this day the enemy lashed three of their iron-clad boats together and dropped down within range of Battery No. 1 and opened fire upon it at 11 a.. m. The remainder of the enemy's gunboats and their mortar floats were placed in position and joined in the conflict. Their fire was principally directed at Battery No. 1, under command of Captain Rucker. The enemy's transports were near by, loaded with troops. Three guns from Captain Rucker's battery as would reach the enemy returned the fire. The conflict was terribly severe and long-continued. The gallant Captain Rucker fired the last shot at 7 p.m. I refer you to subordinate reports for a more detailed report of the conflict. I directed the battery to be repaired during the night. The enemy were repulsed. In obedience to the inclosed instructions I turned the command over to Brig. Gen. L. M. Walker, and left Island No. 10 for Fort Pillow at 11 p.m., taking with me Colonel Marks' Eleventh Louisiana Regiment; Colonel Scott's Twelfth Louisiana Regiment; Colonel Kennedy's "Me-Gown" Louisiana Regiment; Colonel Neely's Fourth Tennessee Regiment; Colonel Bradford's Thirty-first Tennessee Regiment; Colonel Travis' Fifth Tennessee Regiment; Captain Bankhead's and six pieces of Captain Stewart's (Point Coupee)field batteries, and Captains Neely's and Haywood's cavalry, leaving at Madrid Bend five guns of Captain Stewart's field battery; Captains Hudson's and Wheeler's cavalry; Colonel Henderson's Fortieth Tennessee Regiment; Colonel Baker's Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi Regiment; Colonel Gantt's Twelfth Arkansas Regiment; Colonel Smith's Eleventh Arkansas Regiment; Colonels Brown's and Clark's Tennessee Regiments; Colonel Steedman's First Alabama Regiment, and Colonel Terry's Arkansas Battalion. March 18, I arrived at Fort Pillow.
After the evacuation of New Madrid I retained at the island a number of transports, for watch boats, hospitals, and other purposes, as a last resort, had I been compelled to abandon my position, to have carried my command below. In this long conflict I beg to express my obligations to Brig. Gens. A. P. Stewart and L. M. Walker and Colonel Travis, who at different times commanded the force at the mouth of the bayou. I express my thanks for valuable services rendered in that capacity. Lieutenant-Colonel Avery has my thanks and admiration for the gallantry exhibited hi repelling a strong picket force of the enemy and remaining at his post under the most galling fire. I would recommend to your consideration Captain Bankhead, commanding artillery in the upper fort, and Capt. J. W. Stewart, commanding artillery in Fort Thompson, for the energy and ability displayed during the occupation of New Madrid. Colonel Gantt, who commanded Fort Thompson, and afterwards troops to prevent a crossing from the Missouri side, acted with energy, gallantry, and intelligence. Colonel Neely's Fourth Tennessee and Colonel Scott's Twelfth Louisiana Regiments at different times went to Madrid and did picket duty, rendering valuable services. The services rendered by Brig. Gen. James Trudeau were invaluable, and he deserves reward. Colonel Steedman's First Alabama Regiment rendered gallant and efficient service in Battery No. 1 on the 17th instant. Col. A. J. Brown, of the Fifty-fifth Tennessee, assisted the exhausted cannoneers with a detachment of his men on the 17th, rendering valuable service, and at all times has displayed great zeal and energy. Captain Rucker, commanding BatteryNo. 1, defended his battery under adverse circumstances with an obstinate courage worthy of praise, and was gallantly sustained by his lieutenant (Saunders) and Lieut. T. J. Finnie, who volunteered and went to his battery. Captain Humes, commanding artillery on the island, deserves commendation for his energy and proper bearing at times. Captain Harris, Engineers; Captain Gray, Topographical Engineers; and Captain Cummings, signal officer, rendered gallant and valuable services. Captain Wintter, Sappers and Miners, and Lieutenant Tidmarsh, of Ordnance, aside from their valuable services in their respective; departments, rendered good service in gallantly supplying Battery No. 1 with ammunition under a terrific fire from the gunboats. Capt. Thomas Johnston, commanding Southern Guards (artillery), has rendered efficient service, and has at all times acted with great vigilance and energy. Capt. R. A. Stewart, commanding Point Coupee Artillery, a gallant and watchful soldier, rendered valuable services. Lieutenant-Colonel Cook, commanding Twelfth Arkansas, and Major McKay, commanding Fourth Arkansas Battalion, have been active and vigilant in the discharge of their duties. Colonel Kennedy and his regiment, and Captain Flemming, with a portion of his company, labored hard and untiringly in getting the batteries in position. Colonel Marks, for a while in command of the troops opposite Island No. 10, labored assiduously in discharge of his duties. I wish here to express my gratitude to Commander G. N. Hollins, flag-officer, commanding fleet, for his gallant and cordial co-operation. To my staff, Maj. H. S. Bradford, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. B. N. Mathews, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capts. H. S. Foote, jr., and G. P. Smoote, aides-de-camp; Lieut. Em. Ross, acting aide-de-camp; Maj. W. E. Dyer, division quartermaster; Maj. P. T. Glass, division commissary; and Dr. Q. B. Thornton, attached to headquarters, rendered valuable and efficient services; and, in fact, to each and every officer and soldier I feel grateful for the willing discipline with which they labored, watched, and fought in the presence of and with an overpowering force for over thirty days. For further information I inclose document A, Captain Rucker's report [No. 34] ; document B, Captain Wintter's [No. 31] ; document C, Col. E. W. Gantt's [No. 36] ; document D, Colonel Steedman's [No. 39] ; document E, Colonel Brown's [No. 42] ; document F, Captain Gray's [No. 29] ; and document G, General J. Trudeau's [No. 32]. No reports received from either General A. P. Stewart or General Walker, who were charged with the evacuation of New Madrid. Respectfully submitted.
J.P. McCOWN,
Major- General.
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