GENERAL: Special Orders, No. 9, Headquarters Southwestern Division of Missouri, June 4, 1862, was received by me on the day of its date, and in compliance with the instructions therein contained I respectfully submit the following report of my investigation of the circumstances connected with the defeat of Colonel Richardson's force at Neosho.
     On the evening of May 29 Colonel Richardson, with portions of six companies of his regiment, numbering about 225 men, and one company of the Tenth Illinois Cavalry, under Captain Wilson, arrived at Neosho. An examination of the country for 2 miles beyond the town discovered no signs of the enemy, and information was received from the residents of the place that the forces of Coffee and Stand Watie had fallen back at least 40 miles. Under these circumstances Colonel Richardson pitched his camp on the flat north of the village, a site previously selected by General (then Colonel) Sigel for a like purpose.
     On the morning of the 30th Captain Wilson left on his return to this post. All was quiet during the day, and scouting parties were sent out to a distance of 8 miles to the south and southwest, who returned at evening reporting the country clear. Up to this time Colonel Richardson had pickets stationed on each of the five roads leading into the village, each picket consisting of five men and a non-commissioned officer. These pickets were maintained till his retreat. The usual camp guard was also stationed. In the evening of the 30th, after nightfall, a rumor was brought into camp that a force of men were in the college-yard (some half a mile from camp), and the woods full of horses. A council of war was held, the rumor traced to its source, and scouts sent out to examine the facts, but the rumor was not verified. The camp guard was doubled and directions given as to the course to be pursued.
     The night passed without alarm. All danger of attack wins supposed to have passed away, and the hour of 8 a.m. had arrived, when a fire was opened from the brush to the southwest. At this time Captains Burch and Julian and Lieutenants Worley and Kelso were absent from camp. The former was the officer of the day, in the discharge of his duty. Captain Julian and Lieutenant Worley were acting under orders to examine the cells in the court-house, and were accompanied by Lieutenant Kelso. Colonel Richardson immediately ordered Lieutenant Wilson, of Company A, to form his men, and left this company to give orders for the other companies to form. Whether he gave such orders is left in doubt by the conflicting testimony. However each company formed in line. Colonel Richardson ordered his company (A) to charge the brush, but it appears that for some reason the order was not executed. The men of this company fired three rounds, as did also the men of Company H. With these exceptions no firing took place on our side.
     Just after ordering the charge of Company A, Colonel Richardson received a wound in the arm and his horse was shot under him, in the fall laming his left leg, dislocating his shoulder, and spraining his wrist. At this time his entire command seemed seized with a panic and fled in disorder. Within ten minutes from the time of the first shot the camp of Colonel Richardson was clear of men, all the camp equipage and train being abandoned. No adequate reason can be assigned for this precipitate flight. The fall of Colonel Richardson is of course no justification. The enemy undoubtedly was in superior force, but not so much so as to negative all chances of success; and whatever the superiority may have been, it had not at that time been demonstrated. The screaming and whooping of the Indians is said by the officers of the command to have rendered their untrained horses nearly unmanageable. They further remark that quite a number of refugees had accompanied the command to Neosho in the hope of being reinstated in their homes, and that they fled en masse at the first shot, tending to confuse and alarm the troops.
     In this report I have stated as facts what I believe to be true, after the most thorough investigation which the circumstances have permitted me to make. I should state that there is scarcely a point upon which the testimony is not contradictory. The propriety of the conduct of Colonel Richardson upon this occasion is to be inferred from the facts as stated. There is nothing which indicates in any degree a lack of personal courage; neither were any of the ordinary precautions in the way of guards and scouts omitted, save the unaccountable neglect to post a picket upon the hill to the southwest of the camp, over and down which, under cover of the brush, the enemy approached Still, although no picket was posted there, the hill was examined on the night of the 30th. The point most in doubt is whether Colonel Richardson assumed command of all his forces upon the commencement of the attack or confined his directions to Company A, formerly commanded by himself. I am inclined to the opinion that he left Company A under charge of Second Lieutenant Wilson, and proceeded to give directions for the formation of all the companies. Whether good judgment was displayed in the selection of the camp ground so near the brush--60 yards--instead of placing it farther to the eastward and out of gun-shot distance, cannot fairly be determined without an inspection of the ground. One thing deserves reprehension, namely, that so many of the officers should have been ordered or permitted to be away from their companies. On this point, however, the colonel commanding had the right to exercise his own judgment and discretion in regard to the matter, and should be held accountable only in case the lack of prudence on his part was extreme.
     Upon a consideration of the whole case I am not of opinion that the interests of the service require that charges should be preferred against Colonel Richardson. Further investigation, however, is required to show why, upon the fall of Colonel Richardson, the next ranking officer did not assume command; why certain officers were absent from camp at the time of the attack, and why no effort, as it now appears, was made by the officers to rally their men after they first broke. A further report in respect to these points will be submitted as soon as possible. The facts elicited, however, do show that the regiment is deficient in both drill and discipline, and have little confidence in the arms with which they are supplied.
     I attach hereto the report of Colonel Richardson of the attack and his report of losses.
     All of which is respectfully submitted.
          I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

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Report of Brig. Gen. Egbert B. Brown, Missouri Militia.