The general commanding takes this occasion to express his heartfelt thanks to the officers and soldiers of his command for their gallantry at the battle of Prairie Grove, on Sunday, the 7th instant, which crowned the Army of the Frontier with complete success and a brilliant victory.
     When it is considered that the enemy we engaged outnumbered us as three to one; that they were inspired by the confidence of success, and stimulated by the most urgent appeals to their passions and prejudices; that they possessed the advantage of being in their own country, and familiar with every road, hill, and mountain pass; that they possessed every advantage in positions, which were of their own choosing, you have every reason to be proud of having participated upon that bloody field. No battle during the present war has been more determined and bloody, and never was there a field upon which, considering the number of troops engaged and the time occupied, the slaughter was as great.
     The results of your victory cannot be overestimated. The stake was an important one. With your defeat, Western Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian country would have been the prey of the rebel army. Your victory has virtually ended the war north of the Arkansas River. For these results you are entitled to the plaudits of a grateful country.
     To the Second and Third Divisions, for the promptness with which they responded to my request to reenforce me, and the unparalleled marching done by them to reach me before support would be too late, as well as for the gallantry displayed by them upon the field upon that memorable day, the highest praise is justly due.
     Although we have cause to rejoice over our victory, yet we cannot but feel saddened at the loss of our brave comrades who have fallen by our side, and to condole with those to whose homes grief has been brought, by the loss in battle of those friends that were dear; but while we drop the tear of sympathy over their graves, we cannot forget that their death was a noble sacrifice to sustain their country's flag, and that they died such a death as every true soldier and patriot would choose to die.
     Your noble conduct upon the field of Prairie Grove, as also upon other occasions, gives evidence of your invincibility, and assures me that, whatever emergency may arise, you will be equal to the task.

   Page 83 - 84
Report of Brig. Gen. JAS. G. BLUNT

     GENERAL: The enemy's loss in killed and wounded at the battle of Prairie Grove, on the 7th instant, was much greater than was at first supposed. It will not fall short of 3,000, and not less than 1,000 killed. Dead bodies in great numbers were found scattered through the woods for three days after the battle; some of them 10 miles from the scene of conflict, who had been carried to the rear by their comrades, and there left to die. Their wounded are badly mangled, and many of them must die. My artillery was worked upon them with terrible effect. They were left entirely destitute of subsistence, and would have starved had I not provided for them. For our kind treatment they appear very grateful.
     My last advices from Hindman's command is that it was near Van Buren. Their flight across the mountains was precipitate and without order. Their defeat has greatly demoralized their army, and hundreds are throwing down their arms and coming into my lines daily.
     My wounded are well cared for and doing well.
         Respectfully,

   Page 82
Report of Brig. Gen. JAS. G. BLUNT

     Your request, contained within, is a very modest one, and will be granted, provided you allow me to send an artist to your present camp to sketch it and the approaches leading thereto. Such little courtesies must be reciprocated.
         Respectfully, your obedient servant,

   Page 86 - 88
Report of Col. John M. Richardson, Fourteenth Missouri State Militia, Cavalry

     COLONEL: A standing order requires reports to be made to the State headquarters of the part taken by the State troops in all scouts, skirmishes, and battles. In compliance with that order, I have the honor to submit, through the hands of General E. B. Brown, the following report:
     On the 3d instant, I received from General Brown an order directing me to proceed immediately with all the available force at Cassville and report to Brigadier-General Blunt, commanding Army of the Frontier. The order was received at 8 p.m., and at 9 o'clock the troops marched, traveling without tents or camp equipage. I had with me 100 men of the First Battalion of my regiment and 28 men from the First Arkansas Cavalry.
     At 9 p.m. of the 5th, I reported to General Blunt, having traveled 73 miles in three days.
     On the morning of the 6th, General Blunt ordered me to proceed with my troops item Cane Hill down the Cove Creek road to ascertain if the enemy were approaching. On reaching the divide between the waters of White River and Cove Creek, I ordered Captain [S. H.] Julian, with his company, to proceed in advance, to fire on an approaching enemy, and then retreat in haste to the rear of the main column. The captain had not proceeded far before he commenced sending back prisoners, a strong indication we were in close proximity to the rebel forces. He directed the guard bringing in the third prisoner to inform me that he had driven in the rebel picket, and had, 300 yards in his front, a rebel camp, the part he could see containing not less than 2,000 men, and that he was awaiting orders. Upon interrogating the prisoner, I was informed that my command was in less than a mile of a rebel camp containing 18,000 men; that it contained six brigades and six brigade generals, among whom were Parsons, Steen, Marmaduke, Shelby, &c., and that Hindman was to be up that night; that the enemy were moving up the mountain, taking the Chute, the direct road to Cane Hill. My force not being strong enough to harass the camp, after consulting Majors [J.] Sullivan and Fitch, Captain Julian was ordered to return. Contrary to my expectation, the rebel cavalry did not follow, and I returned to report to General Blunt a large rebel force within 6 miles of his headquarters. The reason we were not followed, the enemy supposed us to be a reconnaissance in force, not less than three regiments of cavalry.
     On the 7th, General Blunt directed me to take my own battalion (100 strong), Captain [T.] Conkey, of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, and proceed on the same road as the day previous. Before reaching the Hog-eye Junction, on the Cove Creek road, I met Captain Coleman, of the Ninth Kansas, with 30 men, who reported that the enemy had driven him from the junction, and were marching up the Cove Creek road in great force. A messenger was immediately dispatched to General Blunt to report the fact. The enemy being in possession of the junction, and my position being unfavorable, my force only numbering 166 men, and having good reason to believe the enemy were marching on Cane Hill, I fell back a mile, took a strong position, intending to check and delay their advance as long as possible. The enemy not coming up, Captain Julian was sent forward to ascertain their movements. That prompt and efficient officer soon reported to me the enemy were not marching on Cane Hill, but were moving on the road in the direction of Fayetteville. That fact I immediately reported to General Blunt. The general ordered Colonel [W. R.] Judson to report to me with three squadrons of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, two howitzers, and to direct me to proceed to the junction and attack the enemy. Colonel Judson requested me to take charge of the howitzers, as my men were suitably armed to defend them. Not knowing which ranked, we agreed to jointly command the detachment. We proceeded to the junction, drove in the enemy's pickets just as their rear was passing. Taking into consideration the reason of General Blunt's order, we followed up and harassed the enemy for 5 miles, firing on them and taking several prisoners. About 3 miles from Prairie Grove we found the enemy drawn up in line to resist our advance. They had, to oppose our progress, ten regiments of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and about 1,500 cavalry. Our force, numbering 316 men, was drawn up within 300 yards of the enemy's line. We commenced the attack with the howitzers, the enemy returning our fire with a volley of musketry and one small piece of artillery. Their aim was too high, the balls passing harmlessly over our heads. Being unable to maintain our position, we fell back with our force. Colonel Judson, at my request, consented I should command the rear. We were greatly astonished that the enemy did not follow. They, however, believing we were the advance of General Blunt's whole three, declined accepting our invitation to leave their strong position. We kept this half of the enemy's force in line until they heard General Blunt's guns on their left, thereby preventing them from throwing their whole force (28,000 strong) upon the tired troops of Brigadier-General Herron.
     General Hindman, who commanded the Confederate force, as a military man has been underrated by our wide. Being unwilling to contend with our force united, his feint, marching up the mountain on the Chute road, as if intending to attack General Blunt in front at Cane Hill, and then marching down during the night, taking the road to Fayetteville, intending to fall on the fatigued troops of General Herron (who were on a forced march to re-enforce General Blunt), crush them out, and then turn, and, with his immense army, work on General Blunt at his leisure, indicates military genius of a high order. The movement was executed with that promptness which generally insures success, but General Blunt deceived the enemy. With the force of Colonel Judson and myself, only 316 strong, he caused them to believe he was coming up on their rear, held a large part of their army off General Herron, and made his attack at a point not expected by the enemy.
     I feel it my duty to bear testimony to the ability and soldierly conduct of Colonel Judson and his officers, and of Captains Coleman and Conkey; also to the Kansas troops for great kindness toward us; they received us as brothers and fought with us as true soldiers. The conduct of my own officers and men affords me great pleasure. They were willing to undergo any hardship and fatigue to aid their brethren in arms and advance the interest of the country.
     The courage and discipline of the men, the promptness and ability of the officers, justified me, when we were about to retreat before so large a force, in asking of Colonel Judson the post of honor for them and myself.
         I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

   Page 853
Report of Major General Samuel R. Curtis, U.S. Army, Commanding Army of the Southwest

     GENERAL: 1 am in receipt of your interesting letter of the 12th, which I would like to have published as your report, but I see some remarks concerning General Blunt's being overreached by Hindman and something about Colonel Wright which would not do to publish; besides, I suppose your report will be carefully made out and come through General Blunt, who, in the absence of General Schofield, is the commander of the Army of the Frontier. I hope to get both reports soon, so they may be entered on my battle-book and forwarded to Washington, with such recommendations as I think right in the premises.
     Due credit is given to you and Blunt both, although you had the long, hard day's work. It was a signal victory, but I regret exceedingly the trick of Hindman prevented you sending the cavalry to harass the retreating foe. It was a great outrage of the laws of war to cover a retreat by such use of a flag of truce.
     General Schofield, having recovered, goes back to take command. He is, of course, deeply mortified at not being in the fight.
     You have probably done all you can do until I can move up the Arkansas and White Rivers to co-operate with you. This, I think, cannot be long, but everything has to await the great move down the Mississippi.
     I congratulate you again, general, on your success, in which your numerous friends seem delighted.
         I remain, general, very truly, yours,

   Page 71 - 77
Report of Brig. Gen. JAS. G. BLUNT

     GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, on the 2d instant, and four days subsequent to the battle of Cane Hill, or Boston Mountains, of November 28, I obtained reliable information that the entire force of infantry and artillery of General Hindman's army had crossed the Arkansas River and joined General Marmaduke at Lee's Creek, 15 miles north of Van Buren, to which point the latter had retreated after the battle of the 28th ultimo. I further learned that the united forces under General Hindman's command numbered between 25,000 and 30,000 men, and that he designed advancing upon me in case I did not attack him south of the mountains.
     Determined to hold my position at Cane Hill, unless driven from it by a superior force, I immediately telegraphed to the Second and Third Divisions to come to my support by forced marches. I may here mention that I had no knowledge of the whereabouts of these two divisions, except from rumor, and had not been apprised of their movements or locality for a period of over two weeks. My telegraphic dispatch reached General Herron, commanding the Second and Third Divisions, on the 3d, who promptly responded to my order, keeping me advised, by telegraph from Elkhorn, of his progress.The Second and Third Brigades of the First Division, with my headquarters, were at Cane Hill; the First Brigade at Rhea's Mills, 8 miles north, where a large supply train, just arrived from Fort Scott, was halted. My pickets were advanced 6 miles beyond Cane Hill, on the road leading to Van Buren, and a strong outpost of the Second Kansas established where that road intersects the Cove Creek road, running from Fayetteville to Van Buren, and which road passes about 6 miles east of Cane Hill.
     On the morning of the 5th instant, this outpost was attacked by a large force of rebel cavalry, but they were repulsed and driven back some 6 miles through the mountains. Expecting that the same demonstration would be repeated on the next morning, I directed Colonel [W. F.] Cloud, commanding the Third Brigade, to strengthen this post by the addition of 100 cavalry and two howitzers, to be at the outpost at daybreak. In consequence of this order not being promptly carried out, and the support not arriving at the time directed, the pickets, on being attacked about daylight by a superior force, were compelled to retire some 3 miles, when, support having reached them, they held the ground during the day, with continual skirmishing, in which several of my men were wounded and a number of the enemy killed.
     The enemy had now got possession of the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, and I learned about 8 p.m. that a force of about 10,000 had advanced beyond the junction of the Cove Creek road with the Cane Hill and Van Buren road, and were massed upon the mountain in front of my outpost, while the remainder of the rebel army was below the junction of the roads just named, about 3 miles in rear of their advance. The Third Brigade, under Colonel Cloud, was ordered to bivouac for the night on their arms upon the ground south of the town that I had selected to make a stand upon in case I was attacked in front.
     It was now evident that a general engagement must take place next day, and my apprehensions were that with their superior numbers they would make a feint in front, while with their main force they would make a flank movement on my left, by the Cove Creek road, to intercept General Herron before he could reach me from Fayetteville, which point he was expected to reach by daylight on the morning of the 7th.
     About 9 p.m. of the 6th, I received a note from Colonel [M. La Rue] Harrison, of the First Arkansas Cavalry, who had been ordered down from Elkhorn at the same time that General Herron started from Wilson's Creek, informing me that he had arrived at Illinois Creek, 8 miles north of Cane Hill, with 500 men, and that his horses and men were so tired that he did not think he could move farther until Monday, the 8th. Whether his regard for the Sabbath or the fear of getting into a fight prompted him to make such a report to me, I am unable to say; but, judging from his movements that he was not a man upon whom to place much reliance on the battle-field, I ordered him to proceed by daybreak to Rhea's Mills, to guard the transportation and supply trains at that point, the First Brigade having been ordered to join me at Cane Hill. Had he, instead of making unnecessary delay, promptly obeyed that order, he would not have had a portion of his command and transportation captured by General Marmaduke's advance, as occurred on the morning of the 7th.
     At about 10 p.m. of the 6th, Colonel [D.] Wickersham, with about 1,600 cavalry, of the Second Wisconsin, First Iowa, Tenth Illinois, and Eighth Missouri Regiments, who, at my request, had been sent forward by General Herron, arrived at Cane Hill. I had, as I have before remarked, considerable apprehension that a flank movement would be attempted on my left during the night. I therefore determined to send a cavalry force across on a road called the Hog-eye road, running from the north part of Cane Hill east to the Telegraph road, and crossing the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road about 4 miles north of the junction of the latter with that running from Cane Hill to Van Buren, already referred to, and from which my outpost had been driven in the morning.
     A Colonel [J. M.] Richardson, of the Fourteenth Missouri State Militia, who had arrives during the day with about 150 men, importuned me to be detailed for this service, recommending himself as a brave man, eager for a fight. Committing the folly of taking him upon his own recommendation, I furnished him 100 additional men, making his force 250. Endeavoring to impress upon him the importance of the trust with which he was confided, and stating that I expected the enemy would advance up the Cove Creek road during the night, I directed him to proceed east on the Hog-eye road to the crossing of the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, to select the best position for defense, sending his pickets down the road toward the enemy, and, if their column approached in that direction, to resist their advance to the last extremity, and notify me promptly of their movements. How I was deceived in sending the wrong man on so important a service, the sequel will show.
     At daylight on Sunday morning, I had the transportation of the Second and Third Brigades, of the First Division, hitched up, ready to move to Rhea's Mills, should circumstances render it necessary, and the Second Brigade was ordered to the front, south of the town, where the Third Brigade had bivouacked during the night, the First Brigade and Colonel Wickersham's brigade of cavalry being stationed about 1« miles in the rear, on the north side of the town, where the Hog-eye road intersects that between Cane Hill and Fayetteville, and where it was possible the enemy might attempt to come in upon my rear.
     About 7 o'clock, with my staff, I proceeded to the front. On arriving there, I learned that the enemy were still in considerable force upon the mountain, and so soon as it became sufficiently light they threw several shots from their artillery at my advance outpost, which was replied to by two of my 12-pounder mountain howitzers, without any damage to either party. I directed Colonel [W. F.] Cloud to withdraw his troops on the outposts, with the view of drawing them out and ascertaining their force and design. Upon my advance falling back, the rebels came forward a short distance and formed in line of battle, their right resting on the mountain, their left extending down the valley, and presenting a front of half a mile. It now became evident that their demonstration in front was only a feint, and that their main force had gone by the Cove Creek road, for the purpose of intercepting communication between General Herron and myself, and, notwithstanding that I had received no intelligence from Colonel Richardson, upon whom I had relied to watch this movement, I determined to act accordingly. I immediately ordered the transportation to Rhea's Mills, by a road leading directly north over the mountain, guarded by the Third Indian Regiment (Colonel Phillips), keeping the bottom road on the right, leading to the same point, and also the Fayetteville road, open for the movement of troops. I ordered Colonel Wickersham, with his cavalry, to move rapidly in the direction of Fayetteville and form a junction with General Herron. He was followed by General [Frederick] Salomon's brigade, and the Second and Third Brigades were withdrawn from the front and directed to move rapidly on the Fayetteville road.
     As soon as I determined on this disposition of the forces under me, I sent two messenger parties with dispatches to General Herron, apprising him of my movements, and what I believed to be those of the enemy, and urged him to press forward as rapidly as possible, that we might form a junction of our forces before Hindman could get between us, and also directing him to send his train to Rhea's Mills. Neither of these dispatches reached him, the messengers being cut off by Marmaduke's advance.
     At about 10 a.m., and after the whole of the First Division was in motion toward Fayetteville, I received the first intelligence from Colonel Richardson, who coolly informed me that the rebel forces had been moving up the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road since midnight, and he judged, from the noise, that several batteries of artillery had passed. I afterward learned that Colonel Richardson, instead of obeying my orders, had only gone to within 2 miles of the Cove Creek road, sending a light picket to the crossing, which was driven back by the advance of the rebel column to where the remainder of the party had halted, and where the valiant colonel was content to remain until 9 o'clock the next morning, listening to the tramp of the rebel army, and not even notifying me of the fact until the rear of their column had passed. The con-duet of Colonel Richardson in this instance, upon whose vigilance and strict compliance with orders depended the safety and success of my command, is, to say the least, deserving of the severest censure.
     On learning that Hindman's forces had passed north, I ordered Colonel Judson, with his regiment (cavalry) and two 12-pounder mountain howitzers, to proceed rapidly on the same road by which I had sent Colonel Richardson the previous night, and to attack and harass them in the rear, which order he executed with promptness and gallantry, attacking them in the rear with his howitzers and following them 2 or 3 miles, until they made a stand in such force as to compel him to withdraw his command.
     Moving with my staff in advance of the First Division, on reaching a point some 3 miles north of Cane Hill, where a road to the left leads to Rhea's Mills, I learned that Colonel Wickersham, who was in the advance with the cavalry, and had been instructed to proceed directly on the Fayetteville road, and furnished with a guide, instead of doing so had taken the left-hand road to the mills. Not deeming it prudent, under all the circumstances, to separate my command, I was compelled to follow the same road, in order to get my forces concentrated. On coming up with Colonel Wickersham, I ordered him to proceed in the direction of Fayetteville with all of his cavalry, and endeavor to open communication with General Herron. I also sent forward Major [E. A.] Calkins, with the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, for the same purpose. But a few minutes elapsed after Colonel Wickersham had started with his command, when I heard the discharge of artillery in a northeast direction, and immediately moved rapidly, with the Second and Third Brigades, in the direction of the firing, leaving the First Brigade (General Salomon's) to guard the trains at Rhea's Mills. It was now between 12 and 1 o'clock. The distance to where the firing was heard was about 5 miles, by an obscure road, leading through a valley, with strips of prairie and brush alternating across it. The firing between General Herron's command and the rebel forces was confined to artillery, which, as I approached the field, became more rapid.
     At 1.45 o'clock I came upon the field, in advance of the First Division, when a hasty reconnaissance discovered the enemy in superior force, strongly posted upon elevated ground, behind timber, with the Fayetteville road (on which he had advanced) running through it northeast and southwest. On the north and in front of the enemy's lines was an open valley, divided into large fields, a portion of them cultivated in corn. At the east end of this valley General Herron, with the Second and Third Divisions, was engaged with the enemy, having met their advance early in the day and driven them back to that position.
     For the details of the engagement between the rebels and the Second and Third Divisions, under General Herron, up to the time when I came upon the field, I refer you to the report of that gallant officer.
    The road on which my column was advancing entered the valley at its western extremity and in front of the left wing of the enemy. They had no intimation of my approach on that road, until a large force of their infantry, which, for the purpose of flanking General Herron's division and overwhelming it by superior numbers, had been massed upon their left, was suddenly confronted by the troops of the First Division, when the engagement soon became general along their entire line.
     At about 2 o'clock the fire from the artillery of the First Division was commenced by Rabb's battery, which opened a cross-fire upon two rebel batteries and a heavy body of infantry that were fronting and engaged with General Herron's division. A few moments later and Tenney's battery of Parrott guns came into position on the right and Hopkins' battery on the left of Captain [J. W.] Rabb's. The fire from all three of these batteries was first directed to the enemy's right, where two batteries of the rebels and a heavy body of their infantry were engaged with the Second and Third Divisions. Shell and case-shot from these eighteen pieces were hurled upon the enemy's right with terrible effect. The rebel artillery and infantry, being driven from this position under cover of the wood, the three batteries above named ceased firing, when the infantry of the Second and Third Divisions advanced upon the enemy's right, and the fire of musketry was opened on both sides with great vigor. The Twentieth Wisconsin and Nineteenth Iowa gallantly charged the rebel batteries and drove the enemy from their guns, but were unable to hold them, in consequence of being overwhelmed by a superior force. The Twenty-sixth Indiana and Thirty-seventh Illinois subsequently charged the same batteries with the same result.
     Observing that the enemy had now thrown a large force upon my center and right, I directed the infantry of the First Division to enter the wood and engage them, which order was executed with promptness, Colonel [William] Weer leading the Tenth and Thirteenth Kansas Regiments of his brigade upon the right; a portion of the Second Kansas (dismounted), under command of Capt. S. J. Crawford; the right wing of the Eleventh Kansas, under Colonel [Thomas] Ewing, jr., and the First Indian, under Colonel [S. H.] Wattles, upon the left; the Twentieth Iowa Regiment advancing upon the left of the Indians, the left wing of the Eleventh Kansas, under Lieutenant Colonel [T.] Moonlight, supporting Rabb's and [H] Hopkins' batteries. The First Iowa, Tenth Illinois, Eighth Missouri, and the First Battalion of the Second Wisconsin Cavalry, under Colonel Wickersham, and the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, under Major Calkins, were directed to proceed to my extreme right to watch any flank movement of the enemy that might be attempted in that direction, and also to guard the road leading to Rhea's Mills, and prevent communication being cut off with the First Brigade (General Salomon's).
     The contest by this time (about 3 p.m.) had become vigorous and determined. The entire infantry of the three divisions, and also a portion of the Second Kansas (dismounted), were engaged in the wood with the rebel infantry, three times their number. The rattling of musketry, uninterrupted for fully three hours, was terrific, The contending armies swayed to and fro, each alternately advancing and retiring. Some rebel sharpshooters, firing from the windows of a house situated in the edge of the wood and a little to my left, were evidently directing their compliments specially to myself and staff. I directed Captain Rabb to open upon it with shell, and in a few moments the house was in flames.
     While the infantry was vigorously contesting every inch of ground, I directed Lieutenant [E S.] Stover, with two 12-pounder mountain howitzers, to advance into the wood, which he promptly did, taking position on a little knoll on the right of the Eleventh Kansas, and directing his guns across a small field, where a heavy force of rebels were massed. He poured into them his canister and shell until his ammunition was exhausted and his horses shot down, being compelled to bring away his guns by hand. I then directed Lieutenant [M.D.] Tenney to advance his battery to the edge of the wood, on the left of the Eleventh Kansas, taking position about 200 yards in front of the rebel ranks. From his six 10-pounder Parrott guns he opened on them with terrible effect, driving them back with great slaughter.
     Learning that a heavy force was massing on my right with a view of turning my flank, I immediately withdrew Tenney's battery, and proceeded with it to an open field on the right, at the same time directing the infantry to withdraw from the wood, in order to draw the enemy from under cover and within range of my artillery. On reaching the open field on their right, just alluded to, I discovered the entire division of General Frost advanced to the edge of the timber, and about 200 yards distant. They opened upon us a fierce fire from Enfield rifles, and were in the act of throwing down the fence to make an assault on the battery, which had no support except my own staff and body guard; but Lieutenant Tenney, with commendable promptness, wheeled his guns into position, when their destructive fire of canister and shell soon sent the rebel hordes back under cover of the wood. At the same time a fire from the two mountain howitzers, attached to the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, were directed upon them, farther on my right, with good effect. It was here that the rebel General Steen fell. A few minutes after this last repulse of the enemy by Lieutenant Tenney, a rebel battery of ten guns, supported by a heavy body of infantry, opened from their extreme left, when, bringing his guns to bear in that direction, he, in less than ten minutes, silenced their battery, dismounting two of their guns and driving them from the position with a severe loss. While this attempt was being made to charge my artillery on the right, the same demonstration was made upon Rabb's and Hopkins' batteries, the enemy following up my infantry as they retired from the wood, and with a wild shout rushed out from under cover of the trees, when the two batteries, supported by the infantry of the Eleventh Regiment, belched forth a perfect storm of canister, producing immense slaughter in their ranks and compelling them again to retire. As darkness approached, the fire, which from both artillery and musketry had been terrific and uninterrupted for over three hours, gradually ceased along the whole line, and my command bivouacked upon their arms, ready to renew the conflict at early dawn.
     I could not tell with any certainty the extent of the damage done the enemy, but knowing that they had a force greatly superior to mine in numbers, I felt assured that they would give us battle again in the morning, and made my arrangements accordingly.
     My wounded were all cared for during the night, the transportation and supply trains of the whole army sent to Fayetteville, and General Salomon's brigade, which had been left at Rhea's Mills, ordered to the field; ammunition was brought up and distributed, some refreshments obtained for the men, and everything was in readiness to renew the battle at the first dawn of day; but daylight revealed the fact that the enemy had availed themselves of the night to retreat across the Boston Mountains. Their transportation had been left south of the mountains, and their retreat thereby made unincumbered and stealthily. I am assured by my men who were prisoners with them, as well as by deserters from their ranks, that they tore up the blankets of their men to muffle the wheels of their artillery.
     Just before daylight I received a note from General Hindman, under a flag of truce, requesting a personal interview, to make provision for caring for his dead and wounded. On meeting him, I soon became satisfied that no other force was there, except his staff and escort and a party left to take care of the wounded, and that his forces had commenced retreating early the previous night.
     On looking over the battle-field in the morning, it soon became evident that the enemy had been most roughly handled, and that our artillery had made fearful slaughter in their ranks. Though many had been already carried away, their dead lay strewn over its whole extent.
     The entire Federal loss is: Killed, 167; wounded, 798; missing, 183; total, 1,148.* Of the missing, the greater portion were taken prisoners, and have been since exchanged. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded cannot fall short of 3,000, and will probably much exceed that number, as many of them, not severely wounded, were taken to Van Buren. Their loss in killed upon the ground will reach 1,000, the greater number of whom have been buried by my command. The entire force of Federal troops engaged did not exceed 7,000, about 3,000 cavalry not having been brought into action. The enemy's force, according to their own admission, was 28,000, and all well armed, mostly with the Enfield rifle.
     Many instances of individual gallantry and daring occurred during the day, for an account of which I refer you to the reports of regimental, brigade, and division commanders. As the immediate commander of the First Division, I deem it but justice to say of Col. William Weer, commanding the Second Brigade, that he behaved throughout with great gallantry, leading his men into the thickest of the fight. The same is true of Colonel [T. M.] Bowen and Maj. H. H. Williams, commanding regiments in the same brigade. Capt. S. J. Crawford, of the Second Kansas Cavalry, who commanded a battalion of that regiment that fought on foot, displayed great gallantry, as did also the lamented Capt. A. P. Russell, who fell, mortally wounded. Col. Thomas Ewing, Lieutenant Colonel Moonlight, and Major Plumb, of the Eleventh Kansas, gave evidence of their high qualities as gallant officers. To Captains Rabb and Hopkins and Lieutenants Tenney and Stover, who served their artillery with such terrible and destructive effect upon the enemy's ranks, too much praise cannot be awarded. All did their duty well and nobly. Men of Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana mingled their blood upon the same field, and for the same worthy cause. For their deeds of valor upon the field of Prairie Grove, their native States may well be proud of them.
     I cannot close this report without availing myself of the occasion to express my thanks to Brig. Gen. F. J. Herron for the promptness with which he responded to my order to re-enforce me, as also for the gallantry displayed by him upon the field. His conduct is worthy of emulation and deserving of the highest praise.
     To the members of my staff, Maj. V. P. Van Antwerp, inspector-general; Capt. Oliver Barber, chief commissary; Capt. Lyman Scott, jr., acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieuts. J. Fin. Hill, H. G. Loring, G. M. Waugh, D. Whittaker, and C. H. Haynes, aides-de-camp, who were in the saddle, and with me constantly from before daylight in the morning until the close of the action after dark, I am indebted for efficient and valuable services on the field. Made a special target by the rebel troops, in obedience to the notorious address of their commander (General Hindman), issued on the eve of battle, and a printed copy of which, over his signature, each of them carried upon his person, "to shoot down my mounted officers," they were saluted wherever they rode by a perfect storm of balls from the enemy's guns.
     I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 Go on to the Expedition from Ozark, Mo. into Marion County, Ark., December 9-15, 1862

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